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ANILCA1 under Attack: Will the




It is unfortunate that the term "subsistence rights" was des-
ignated to describe the legal hunting and fishing rights of Alaska
Native Americans. These "rights" entail more than just eking out
a living off the land: it is a way of life that is threatened with
destruction. Subsistence rights are protected by law in Alaska,
and to the uninitiated, the terminology would suggest that any
person "living off the land" should be granted protection. But this
interpretation ignores the rich cultural heritage that the Alaska
Native associates with the hunting and trapping of animals. The
purpose of the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act
(ANILCA) was to conserve the renewable natural resources of
Alaska while providing for those people whose livelihood and well-
being depend on the utilization of those resources. ANILCA pro-
vides them with a way to continue their ancestral traditions and
protects their culture by recognizing a preference for subsistence
rights over other uses of the land. To allow a greater number of
people to enjoy the subsistence preference defeats ANILCA's pur-
pose and fails to recognize the unique relationship the Alaska Na-
tives have always maintained with their fragile, yet harsh
environment.
Under pressure from state legislators, Congress defined sub-
sistence user as any rural resident of Alaska, fearing that the orig-
inal definition, Native American, would be labelled discriminatory
and open to a constitutional attack. Thirteen years and many law-
Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126 (1985).
* Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1994, University of Kentucky; B.A., Boston State College; B.S.N., University of
Kentucky. IMMR Fellow, fall, 1993. 1 would like to thank the staff of Alaska Legal Ser-
vices, Fairbanks, Alaska, for their support and encouragement in this endeavor.
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suits later, the courts may regret Congress' compromise language.
Not only did Congress confuse the issue by allowing individuals
without the history and traditions of the Alaska Native to enjoy
the subsistence preference, but the "rural" language has not
guarded the statute against constitutional attacks. In the most re-
cent litigation, McDowell v. United States,2 the plaintiffs claim,
inter alia, that the non-rural/rural distinction denies them equal
protection by burdening their right to travel." The U.S. Constitu-
tion guarantees that no state shall "deny to any person . . . the
equal protection of the laws."' The plaintiffs in McDowell assert
that the rural residency requirement of ANILCA interferes with
their constitutional right to travel because the same rights to hunt
and fish are not afforded them should they choose to exercise their
right to travel and move to the city.
This note will discuss whether or not subsistence rights under
ANILCA can withstand this constitutional attack. While the fed-
eral government appears committed to the preservation of the cus-
toms, culture, and mores of the Alaska Native American, the
State of Alaska has not been.' The conflict in this instance reflects
the clash of economic interests and environmental interests: the
desire to promote tourist and sporting interests versus the desire to
safeguard Alaska's pristine wilderness and the Alaska Native
American way of life.
I. BACKGROUND
Alaska Native Americans do not live on reservations 6 and
2 McDowell v. United States, No. A92-53L, slip op. (D. Alaska Oct. 7, 1992).
' Id. at 37.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1989)(holding rural distinction in
Alaskan subsistence statute violated Alaska Constitution); see also Mary Kancewick &
Eric Smith, Subsistence in Alaska: Towards A Native Priority. 59 UNiv MissouR-KAN-
SAS CItY L. REv, 645. 653 (1991):
The federal government recognizes a special responsibility for the protection
of the welfare of Alaska Native tribes and their tribal governments and cul-
ture, just as it does for Native American tribes in the lower forty-eight
states. The state of Alaska, for the most part, recognizes no special responsi-
bility for Alaska Natives, but rather a general responsibility for the welfare
of all its citizens.
There is one exception. The Metlakatla reservation, an Indian community on An-
nette Island, was statutorily created in the 1890's and was not abolished by ANCSA. See
DAVID S- CASE. ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 83-88 (1984).
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have never entered into treaties with the United States.7 Their
land claims were not addressed by Congress until 1971 and re-
ceived attention at that time only because oil had been discovered
in Prudhoe Bay in northern Alaska in 1968. The oil companies
and the state were eager to begin construction on the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline but were stymied by conflicting claims to the
land.' As a result, the Alaska Natives Claims Settlement Act"
(ANCSA) was passed extinguishing Native land claims in Alaska
in exchange for title to forty-four million acres of land and almost
one billion dollars. ANCSA also provided for the formation of
Native village corporations as well as regional corporations to
manage and administer the land and money."0
It was quickly apparent that ANCSA did not resolve the Na-
tive Americans' problems. Confusion still existed as to their rights
to continue time-honored fishing and hunting traditions under
ANCSA; the State was only paying lip service to Congress' expec-
tation that "the State . . . take any action necessary to protect
the subsistence needs of the Native."" Out of these concerns was
born Title VIII of ANILCA creating the subsistence preference
for rural residents on federal lands in Alaska.
ANILCA was a hotly-contested bill that was signed by Presi-
dent Carter in December 1980, just prior to his leaving office.
Fearing a defeat of the bill under President Carter's successor,
Ronald Reagan, its proponents were willing to concede certain
I The United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867. In 1871, Congress passed
an appropriations bill that disallowed treaty negotiations with Native American tribes. Al-
though neither Russia nor the United States had "conquered" the Alaska Natives and no
treaty was ever signed relinquishing their rights, one of the crucial issues facing the Alaska
Native today is lack of recognition by the federal government of tribal sovereignty. See
generally THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY 140 (1985); CASE, supra note 6, at 6.
1 The Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), allowed Alaska to
withdraw 103 million acres of land while the Native Allotment Act of 1906, ch. 2469, 34
Stat. 197 (repealed 1971), allowed an individual Alaska Native to homestead 160 acres of
nonmineral land. The tribal communities also claimed aboriginal rights in their ancestral
lands arising from prior use and occupancy.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1971).
1o BERGER, supra note 7, at 20-45. The corporate form was thrust upon the Native
Alaskans in an attempt to assimilate them into American culture. The Natives, however,
were corporate illiterate and forced to consult and hire non-Native managers. Managers
and stock holders are often at odds as the Natives expect the corporation to protect their
traditional lifestyle while the corporate officers' goal is to maximize a monetary profit, id.
11 S. REP. No. 92-581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971).
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points in order to gain approval by the 1980 Congress.'2 Besides
the subsistence issue, ANILCA added more than one hundred
million acres to conservation systems in Alaska. This was an ap-
parent victory for the environmentalists, but in their haste to en-
sure the passage of the bill, they accepted compromise language,
such as the rural resident definition in Title VIII that has caused
as many problems as the bill was meant to solve.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS UNDER ANILCA
The intent of Congress was to allow Alaska to implement Ti-
tle VIII of ANILCA so long as the state was in compliance with
the subsistence preference provisions." Because ANILCA's sub-
sistence preference applies to all federal lands in Alaska, which
constitute sixty percent of the state, Alaska was willing and eager
to oversee ANILCA's implementation.
The seeds of the implementation problems were planted even
before ANILCA was passed. The State enacted a subsistence
preference bill in 1978 in anticipation of ANILCA but did not
include the rural residency language.' 4 In order to comply with
ANILCA and gain control of its implementation, the Board of
Fisheries adopted regulations that met ANILCA's requirements.
The Alaska Supreme Court in Madison v. Alaska Department of
Fish and Game"5 found that the Board had exceeded its authority
by restricting subsistence users based on residency, which was in-
consistent with the 1978 state statute. To be able to maintain
their supervisory rights over the federal as well as the state lands,
the Alaska Legislature responded with a new subsistence law that
included the rural language.' 6
"2 CLAUSE M. NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF THE 49TH
STATE 234 (1987).
11 S. REP. No. 96-413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 270 (1980) (stating "[the State system
of local and regional participation shall be in compliance with the requirements of this
section and the Secretary [of the Interior] shall not establish local committees or regional
councils if the State [complies] .... ).
' There was no residency requirement in the 1978 subsistence law. ALASKA STAT.
§ 16.05.940(32) (1992) (defining subsistence uses as "the noncommercial, customary and
traditional uses of wild, renewable resources by a resident domiciled in a rural area of the
state for direct personal or family consumption").
696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985).
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(32) (1992) (defining subsistence uses as "the noncom-
mercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, renewable resources by a resident domi-
ciled in a rural area of the state for direct personal or family consumption").
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However, the Alaska Supreme Court again struck the rural
residency language in McDowell v. Alaska," and once again
Alaska was out of compliance with ANILCA. The court found
that the 1986 statute violated provisions of Article VIII of the
Alaska Constitution prohibiting an exclusive right in a natural re-
source. 18 These provisions reflect Alaska's basic approach to re-
source management: "1) management of renewable resources
must be on the basis of sustained yield; 2) management of re-
sources will recognize multiple uses whenever possible; 3) no pri-
vate property right may be created in any fishery; and 4) the pub-
lic should have the broadest possible access to and use of the
state's natural resources." 9 Federal administration of the subsis-
tence preference began when temporary regulations were issued in
June 1990.20 This federal intervention led to the unhappy state of
affairs created by a subsistence preference applicable to rural
Alaskans on federal lands and to all Alaskans on state lands.
III. McDOWELL V. UNITED STATES
Encouraged by their success in whittling away at the subsis-
tence preference in state court, the McDowell plaintiffs are now
challenging the federal rural residency requirement in Title VIII
of ANILCA on the basis of violations of the Equal Footing Doc-
" 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1989).
18 The Alaska Constitution states:
Sec. 3. Whenever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters
are reserved to the people for common uses.
Sec. 15. No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created
or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict
the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for the purposes of
resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and
those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient de-
velopment of aquaculture in the State.
Sec. 17. Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural
resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference
to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.
ALASKA CONST., art. VIll, §§ 3, 15, 17.
19 James M. Boardman, McDowell v. State of Alaska: Is A Limited Entry Subsis-
tence System on the Horizon? 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 999, 1006 (1990) (footnotes
omitted).
20 Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska, 55 Fed. Reg.
27,121 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 100).
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trine of the Alaska Statehood Act,21 the Eleventh Amendment, 2
and the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgement on each count. An appeal is pend-
ing based partly on the controversy in the lower circuit courts con-
cerning the right to travel and the inclusion of intrastate as well as
interstate travel in this right. The following discussion will focus
on this controversy in relation to the urban/rural distinction in
ANILCA.
IV. THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL
The right to interstate travel has long been recognized as an
implied fundamental right although there is no consensus as to its
constitutional source. Justice Byrnes, writing the majority opinion
in Edwards v. California,2" cited the Commerce Clause as
grounds to find a California statute prohibiting the transport of
indigent persons into the state unconstitutional, while Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion2" cited from the early case of Cran-
dall v. Nevada2" that "the right to move freely throughout the
nation was a right of national citizenship."' 6 Justice Jackson27
preferred to root the right in "that clause of the Constitution by
virtue of which Duncan is a citizen of the United States and
which forbids any state to abridge his privileges or immunities as
such."'" The right to interstate travel has also been found in the
due process clause29 and the equal protection clause."0 Whatever
" The Equal Footing Doctrine is derived from the statement within the Alaska State-
hood Act which admits Alaska to the Union. "The State of Alaska is hereby declared to be
a State of the United States of America, is declared admitted into the Union on an equal
footing with other States in all respects whatever ...." (emphasis added). The Statehood
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). The equal footing doctrine also ensures that
Alaska has the same rights to manage its own natural resources as do all other States.
McDowell v. U.S., No. A92-531, slip op. (D. Alaska Oct. 7, 1992).
22 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
22 314 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1941).
2 Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
2 314 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original).
27 Id. at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 182.
2' Lutz v. York, 899 F.2d 255, 271 (3d. Cir. 1990) In Lutz, the Third Circuit recog-
nized that there was a constitutional right to intrastate travel in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to substantive due process. At issue was a law prohibiting cars from "cruising,"
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the source of the right, when a statutory scheme appears to violate
this unanimously recognized fundamental right, the courts must
apply a strict scrutiny test to determine if there is a compelling
state interest that warrants the purported violation. a
The United States Supreme Court interstate travel cases can
be divided into four categories: durational requirements, bona fide
or continuing residency requirements, prior residency require-
ments, and violations of certain civil rights statutes.
A. Durational Requirements
In the seminal case Shapiro v. Thompson,3 2 the Supreme
Court found that a one-year residency requirement for welfare
benefits created two classes: those who have resided in the juris-
diction for more than one year and those who have not. This dis-
tinction "constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them
equal protection of the laws ''33 and interfering with the basic right
of the freedom to travel. The right to travel need not be actually
violated; the individual need only be penalized by exercising his or
her right: "if a law has 'no other purpose . . . than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.' "3 The
Court did not outlaw waiting periods or residency requirements
or traveling repeatedly over the same highway around York, PA. While the Court recog-
nized that intrastate travel was a constitutional right under substantive due process, such a
right could be overcome by significant and legitimate state interests, id. at 270. The Court
held that since the scope of the law was narrow and the interests of public safety and
reducing congestion were significant city objectives, this law met the exception criteria and
therefore was constitutional, id. at 271.
" Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). The Supreme Court found that Alaska's
Permanent Fund, into which at least 25% of Alaska's mineral income per year must be
placed by the state, violated the Equal Protection Clause because it paid out yearly divi-
dends only to Alaska residents who lived in the state prior to statehood in 1958, id. at 57.
The plaintiffs based their claim of equal protection violation on their right to travel inter-
state from outside Alaska to inside the state since the law discriminated expressly on this
basis, id. The Court ruled that since there was no significant state interest which was pro-
tected by the law, it was unconstitutional, id. at 65.
S Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). The court stated that "the tradi-
tional criteria do not apply in these cases .... Since the classification here touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the
stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." Id. (emphasis in
original).
32 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
a Id. at 627.
Id. at 631 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1986)).
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per se, indicating that "such requirements may promote compel-
ling state interests . . or . may not be penalties upon the ex-
ercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel." '
In another durational residency case, Dunn v. Blumstein, 6
the Supreme Court ruled that Tennessee's one-year residency re-
quirement for exercising the right to vote was unconstitutional.
The Court found no compelling state interest to justify such a vio-
lation of equal protection that impinged on a fundamental right.
This Court reaffirmed the distinction between bona fide require-
ments versus durational requirements, stating that the former
could withstand close constitutional scrutiny while the latter could
not.
3 1
A third case addressing the durational requirements is Me-
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County.38 Here, the Court deter-
mined that a one-year wait to receive nonemergency medical care
at a county hospital impermissibly infringed on the right to travel.
The appellees sought to distinguish this situation from Shapiro,3 9
claiming that Shapiro applied to an interstate right to travel,
while in Memorial Hospital, a county hospital was denying in-
state residents equal benefits, thereby interfering with the right to
intrastate travel. Because plaintiff was from out-of-state, the
Court refused to address the intrastate .issue, stating "[e]ven were
we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and in-
trastate travel, a question we do not now consider, such a distinc-
tion would not support the judgment of the Arizona court in the
case before us. ' 40 This refusal to reach the intrastate issue has led
to much confusion in later lower court decisions.
It was the loss of the right to vote and access to basic necessi-
ties (welfare and medical care) that prompted the Court to find
that the plaintiffs were penalized for exercising their right to
travel. The Court has not set specific guidelines for those viola-
tions that might rise to the level of a penalty triggering strict scru-
tiny. In a subsequent right to travel decision, Justice O'Connor
noted that "it is fair to infer that something more than a negligi-
I3 d. at 639 n.21.
O 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
" Id. at 343.
' 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'o Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 255-56.
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ble or minimal impact on the right to travel is required before
strict scrutiny is applied." '
In the context of durational requirements, two areas have es-
caped strict scrutiny because the impact on the right to travel did
not trigger the higher standard. In Starnes v. Malkerson2 and
Sturgis v. Washington,a one-year residency requirements were
upheld for lower in-state college tuition. The states were able to
cite legitimate interests that overcame equal protection concerns.
In Sosna v. Iowa," an Iowa court dismissed a petition for divorce
because neither spouse had resided in the state for one year. The
Court upheld the decision because "[a]ppellant was not irretriev-
ably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought ....
[because] [s]he would eventually qualify .... Iowa's requirement
delayed her access to the courts, but, by fulfilling it, she could
ultimately have the same opportunity for adjudication. 14 5 The
Sosna Court found that Iowa's interests were reasonably justified;
those seeking a divorce must have a genuine attachment to the
state, and the divorce decrees must be insulated from possible
later collateral attacks.""
B. Bona Fide/Continuing Residency Requirements
The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction
between durational residency requirements that dictate the length
of time one must reside in a jurisdiction before certain benefits are
available and bona fide/continuing residency requirements that
require only that one live in the jurisdiction to qualify for certain
benefits. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commis-
sion,"7 a Philadelphia city firefighter was terminated when he
moved to New Jersey due to an ordinance requiring residency in
Philadelphia. The Court found no question of the "validity of ap-
propriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence re-
" Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 921 (1986) (plurality)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, Rehnquist and Stevens, J.J. joining).
,' 401 U.S. 985 (1971), affd, 326 F.Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970)(three judge court).
' 414 U.S. 1057 (1973), ajf'd, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973)(three judge
court).
- 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
"5 Id. at 406.
16 Id. at 406-09.
" 424 U.S. 645 (1976)(per curiam).
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quirements."'4  The ordinance was upheld as "it was not
irrational."4 9
C. Prior Residency Requirements
Evaluating a different type of residency requirement, the Su-
preme Court in Zobel v. Williams 0 found that permanent and
fixed distinctions based on length of time in the state violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The State of Alaska was distributing
funds to its citizens according to the date of migration to the
state. The Court found that this uneven distribution of funds
made the distinction subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 51 This holding was af-
firmed in two subsequent decisions. In Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor," a New Mexico statute granting a tax exemp-
tion to Vietnam veterans living in the state before a certain date
was struck down. In Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lo-
pez,5 ' a New York law granting civil service preference to appli-
cants who had entered the military while a resident of the state
was struck down. 4 The critical factor for the Court in all three
cases was that "the Constitution will not tolerate a state benefit
program that 'creates fixed, permanent distinctions . . . between
• . . classes of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long
they have been in the state.' "I The benefit, precluded simply on
the basis of "nonresidence" at a former time, was irretrievably
lost to the newcomer.
• Id. at 647 (quoting Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255
(1974)).
" Id. at 646; see also Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F.Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972)(three
judge court)(upholding a city ordinance requiring police officers and firefighters to reside
within the municipality under the strict scrutiny test).
o 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
' /d. at 60.
472 U.S. 612 (1985).
'3 476 U.S. 898 (1986)(plurality).
While the Court in Soto-Lopez explicitly states that their opinion rests on the fact
that the civil service preference penalizes certain veterans who have exercised their right to
migrate, thereby triggering the stricter standard, the Zobel and Hooper Courts never reach
the strict standard but state the statutes do not pass a rational-basis test under the Equal
Protection Clause. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 905-06; see Hooper, 472 U.S. at 618 n.6.
" Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 908 (quoting Hooper, 472 U.S. at 623 and Zobel, 457
U.S. 55, 59 (1982)).
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D. Civil Rights Violations
The Court has decided several cases involving the right to
travel in the context of a civil rights violation. In these instances, a
fundamental right must be violated in order for the plaintiff to
maintain an action under the particular civil rights statute. For
example, in Griffin v. Breckenridge5" the Court found a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)57 when two black men were threatened
and beaten by two white men while traveling on the highway. The
Court determined that not only must there be a violation of a fun-
damental right but that there must also be "some racial, or per-
haps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus be-
hind the conspirators' action."" The plaintiffs properly stated a
cause of action under § 1985(3); the case was remanded to the
District Court for a determination of whether, inter alia, their
right to travel interstate had been violated.59
The language of ANILCA does not violate any of these clas-
sifications. There is no durational requirement and no fixed and
permanent classifications. The legislative history reports that "this
amendment is not intended to impose a 'durational' rural resi-
dency requirement in the definition or impede the traditional
movement of Alaska residents between the rural areas and the
major population centers and vice versa."' ANILCA's residency
requirement falls more into the McCarthy-like61 category of con-
tinuing residency requirements, requirements which have been
consistently upheld. There is a rational connection between the
statute and the purposes it was to serve. Congressional policy is
expressly stated in ANILCA: "Consistent with sound manage-
ment principles, and the conservation of healthy populations of
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
' If two or more persons in any State or territory conspire, or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws . . . whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages ....
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
88 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
19 Id. at 106-07.
60 S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5070, 5177.
" See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service, 424 U.S. 645 (1976)(per curiam).
1993-94]
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fish and wildlife, the utilization of the public lands in Alaska is to
cause the least adverse impact possible on rural residents who de-
pend upon subsistence uses of the resources of such lands."62 To
provide the least adverse impact on subsistence users while con-
serving the wild, renewable resources, the preference should re-
main as limited as possible. Nor does ANILCA impose a perma-
nent deprivation based on the date of migration. A newcomer to
Alaska may choose to reside in any part of Alaska; subsistence
rights are incidental to that choice and not irretrievably lost be-
cause of that choice.
V. THE RIGHT TO INTRASTATE TRAVEL
The Supreme Court has not recognized a fundamental right
to intrastate travel and expressly declined to address the issue in
Memorial Hospital.3 This has left a void that the circuit courts
have unsuccessfully attempted to fill: the First Circuit impliedly
recognizes the right to intrastate travel;6 the Second and Third
Circuits expressly recognize it;65 a Fourth Circuit district court,
the Fifth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit reject it;66 the Seventh
Circuit has not reached the issue; 7 the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have not spoken to the issue; and an Eleventh District
Court recognizes the right. 8
62 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1) (1985).
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
, See Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
66 King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971)(hold-
ing five-year waiting period for federally-funded low income housing unconstitutional
where the two plaintiffs were in-state residents); Lutz v. City of York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255,
268 (3d Cir. 1990)(recognizing right to travel through public spaces but upholding anti-
"cruising" ordinance after intermediate scrutiny).
66 Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 753-55 (W.D.Va. 1986)(finding no funda-
mental right to intrastate travel and upholding a difference in pay based on county of
residence under the rational basis test), affTd, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987); Wright v. City
of Jackson, Miss., 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975)(upholding an ordinance requiring munici-
pal employees to live within city limits and finding no fundamental right to intrastate
travel); Wardwell v. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976)(upholding an ordi-
nance requiring teachers to live within school district and finding no fundamental right to
intrastate travel).
6" Andre v. Bd. of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 53 (7th Cir. 1977)(upholding an ordinance
requiring certain municipal employees to establish residency within city limits: "inasmuch
as a residency requirement is not involved in this case, we need not consider whether a
right of intrastate travel should be acknowledged"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1977).
" Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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The earlier intrastate travel decisions of the First, Second,
and Third Circuits adopted traditional interstate travel theory and
applied it to in-state residents, finding violations only in the con-
text of durational requirements.8 The First Circuit was the first
court to address the issue in Cole v. Housing Authority of New-
port."0 The Cole Court did not specifically address the right to
travel intrastate but found unconstitutional a two-year waiting pe-
riod for low-income housing affecting both in-state and out-of-
state residents. The court interpreted the scope of "travel" as ad-
dressed in the Shapiro decision: travel as "migration with intent
to settle and abide" because, otherwise, "any residency require-
ment might be thought to penalize the right to travel if 'travel' is
used in the sense of movement."'71 Using the latter definition, a
tollbooth on the highway would be unconstitutional.72 Other
courts adopted this interpretation of travel, and even the Supreme
Court refers to the "right to migrate" in the 1986 Soto-Lopez
decision .7
The 1971 King decision of the Second Circuit,7" striking
down a five-year residency requirement for low-income housing,
did not attempt to identify a constitutional source for the right to
intrastate travel but found it to be a logical extension of the right
to interstate travel: "It would be meaningless to describe the right
to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal lib-
erty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to
travel within a state."73
The more recent intrastate travel cases have transformed the
Cole definition of travel from the "right to migrate and settle"
" See Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972)(invalidating a five-year
residency requirement before Wilmington resident could run for mayor), affd, 485 F.2d
1151 (3d Cir. 1973); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1971)(invalidating a five-year waiting period involving in-state resident), cert denied, 404
U.S. 863 (1971); Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970)(holding
unconstitutional a two-year residency requirement involving in-state petitioner).
70 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
71 Id. at 811.
" Elizabeth A. Johnson, Note, Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown: The Right to
Travel and the Constitutionality of Continuous Residency Requirements, 2 ALASKA L.
REV 339 343 (1985).
" See 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986). "Our right-to-migrate cases have principally in-
volved the latter, indirect manner of burdening the right." Id. (emphasis added)
" See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971)(holding
unconstitutional a five-year waiting period involving an in-state resident), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 863 (1971); see also note 65 and accompanying text.
7 King, 442 F. 2d at 648.
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into a right to move about freely. Building on the language quoted
above from King, the Second Circuit found an infringement on
one's right to travel freely outside the durational requirement vio-
lation of interstate travel case law in Spencer v. Casavilla.6 In
Spencer the claimant's son, a young black man, had been beaten
to death by the four white defendants. In order to maintain a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 7 7 it was necessary for
the court to find a violation of a federally-protected right. The
court held that plaintiff's complaint stated a valid claim that his
right to travel within New York State without being subjected to
a racially motivated attack had been violated.78 The case was re-
manded for further proceedings. In the Third Circuit, the court
found that there is a constitutional right to "cruise" (the right to
repeatedly drive around the major thoroughfares of town) but up-
held an anti-cruising ordinance in Lutz v. City of York, Pennsyl-
vania." The court determined that the source for this "right to
travel locally through public spaces and roadways""' is the Due
Process Clause which "protects unenumerated rights 'so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental.' "81 The court admitted that the government must have
some "flexibility to regulate access to and use of, the publicly held
instrumentalities of . . . travel." 8' If the court were to apply the
strict scrutiny test demanded by Shapiro to the newly created
right to travel freely, the ordinance would not have passed muster.
The court's solution was to borrow an intermediate scrutiny from
First Amendment jurisprudence that would tailor the test for con-
stitutionality to the context of the situation; "reviewing all in-
fringements on the right to travel under strict scrutiny is just as
inappropriate as applying no heightened scrutiny to any
infringement."8
A district court in the Eleventh Circuit also adopted the
broader definition of travel in Pottinger v. Miami,8 4 finding a
cause of action under another civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.
" 903 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1990).
" See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
7' 903 F.2d at 176.
899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
I5 d. at 268.
" Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)(plurality)).
12 899 F.2d at 269.
'I Id.
810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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§ 1983.85 Here, a class action was brought on the behalf of all
involuntarily homeless people of Miami. Many of them had been
arrested for violations of ordinances prohibiting loitering, ob-
structing sidewalks, and sleeping in the park after hours. The
court found the ordinances unconstitutional partly because they
infringed on the plaintiffs' right to intrastate travel.8 6
VI. WHETHER ANILCA VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO INTRASTATE
TRAVEL DEPENDS ON THE MEANING ATTRIBUTED TO 'TRAVEL'
If the Supreme Court were to recognize a constitutional basis
for the right to intrastate travel, the ANILCA distinctions would
not violate that right under traditional interstate travel theory be-
cause there are no durational residency requirements and no per-
manent classifications. Using the expanded definition of travel,
minimal burdens could be considered unconstitutional.8" Even
bona fide residency requirements would fall prey to the overreach-
ing "movement" definition of travel.88 The difficulty of finding any
residency requirement valid would be compounded by the strict
standard of review required by the violation of a fundamental,
federally-protected right as it is extremely difficult for any statute
to pass the seemingly insurmountable compelling state interest
standard .89
Every person who ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993).
"6 The court was also relying on two Supreme Court cases that had found anti-loiter-
ing laws void for vagueness. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)(holding a Cali-
fornia statute that required production of identification upon police officer's request uncon-
stitutional); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 1546 (1972)(holding a Florida
loitering statute unconstitutional because of arbitrariness and lack of notice).
11 See Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (lst Cir. 1970). "Any resi-
dency requirement might be thought to penalize the right to travel it 'travel' is used in the
sense of movement. A resident of Maine vacationing for a month in New Hampshire might
be penalized for traveling if he could not obtain the benefits of a library card in New
Hampshire during his vacation." Id. at 8 11.
89 See Andrew C. Porter, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intra-
state Travel, 86 Nw. U. L REV. 820 (1992),
89 Chief Justice Burger states that "[t]o challenge such lines [voting requirements] by
the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). But see Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F.Supp. 492
(D.N.J. 1972)(upholding a city ordinance requiring police officers and firefighters to reside
within municipality under a strict scrutiny test); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
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A solution to this inflexibility would be to adopt the Third
Circuit's creative use of the intermediate standard of review in
right to travel cases. The magnitude of the burden on the right to
travel would determine the level of scrutiny applied to the viola-
tion. A direct burden with substantial infringement of one's right
to travel, whether interstate or intrastate, would be the only sce-
nario calling for strict scrutiny. Lesser burdens that impose a
smaller degree of infringement on the right to travel would receive
a more relaxed scrutiny ranging from the intermediate level down
to the rational basis test. Borrowing terminology from gender dis-
crimination theory, the intermediate test would require that the
questionable classifications in the statutory language be substan-
tially related to important governmental objectives.9"
In the same vein as the Third Circuit proposal and gender
discrimination is Alaska's "sliding scale" equal protection analy-
sis. Alaska was unhappy with the two-tiered system that required
either a rational basis test, which could almost always be met, or
the compelling state interest test, which could almost never "be
met.91 As a result, the Alaska Supreme Court formulated a single
standard of review in State v. Ostrosky. "The applicable stan-
dard of review for a given case is to be determined by the impor-
tance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspi-
cion with which we view the resulting classification scheme."1
9 3
The standard of review does not turn on whether a right is funda-
mental or not, but on the importance of the individual's interest in
that right. The amount of judicial weight that is given to that
interest determines the standard of review. The statute's purpose
must be closely examined, and the classification will be found un-
constitutional if there is a "less restrictive alternative" that would
accomplish the same purpose.9 '
(1944)(upholding a statute imposing restrictions on a single racial group under a strict
scrutiny test).
90 See Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observations about Race, Sex, and Equal Prolec-
lion, 59 TULANE L. REV 928 (1985).
11 See Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights-Equal Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3
ALASKA L. REv, 1. 17-21 (1986).
" 667 P.Zd 1184 (Alaska 1983)(holding limited entry restriction did not violate
Alaska constitution provisions prohibiting exclusive rights of fishery because the Limited
Entry Act's objectives are legitimate and fairly and substantially furthered by free
transferability).
93 Id. at 1192-93.
" Alaska Pacific Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
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VII. ANILCA WOULD PASS INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
Alaska is more than twice the size of Texas 6 with a popula-
tion less than San Francisco." About one-third of the population
lives in rural villages."' Many of these villages are inaccessible by
car. While there is a growing mixed cash/subsistence economy in
the villages, there is still a heavy reliance on the harvest of wild,
renewable resources."8 Most of these villagers are Native Ameri-
cans to whom hunting and fishing is not a matter of sportsman-
ship, but an integral part of their spiritual and social customs as
well as a matter of survival. As one Indian Elder has said: "[T]he
land is keeping us alive; we are connected to the land." 9
Justice John Marshall defined and clarified the federal gov-
ernment's relationship with the Indians in a trilogy of cases in the
early 1800's. Due to the Indians' unique position as a "domestic
dependent nation," there was a trust-like relationship between the
federal government and the tribes that resembled "that of a ward
to his guardian."'0 0 As Felix Cohen, noted authority on Indian
Law, has stated: "the trust obligation apparently requires that
[federal] statutes be based on a determination that the Indians
will be protected." 10' The Supreme Court recently agreed with
Cohen in Montana v. Blackfeet when it refused to let Montana
tax the tribe's royalty interests in certain oil and gas leases, stat-
ing that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the In-
, NASKE & SLOTNIK, supra note 12, at 5.
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS SECTION, ALASKA DEP'T OF LABOR. ALASKA POPULA-
TION FOR BOROUGHS, CENSUS AREAS AND PLACES, 1980-90 (JUNEAU, ALASKA, JANUARY
28. 1991), reprinted in 14 COMMUNITY RESEARCH Q. 63 (1991). Population figures for
1990 show a thirty-seven percent increase from 1980 for a total of 550,043, id.
" NASKE & SLOTNIK, supra note 12, at 5.
RICHARD A. CAULFIELD, DIVISION OF SUBSISTENCE, ALASKA DEP'T OF FISH &
GAME, TECH. PAPER No. 16, SUBSISTENCE LAND USE IN UPPER YUKON-PORCUPINE COM-
MUNITIES (1983). In Fort Yukon, at least 50% of the meat and fish were derived from local
sources, id. Other villages reported similar numbers, id.
" Interview with Jim Christian, Elder of Native Village of Venetie, Alaska (March,
1993)(conducted as part of a grant funded by the American Native Association to provide
a written history of Alaska Native traditions and culture).
" Heather Noble, Tribal Powers to Regulate Hunting in Alaska, 4 ALASKA L. REV.
223. 245-46 (1987) (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)(defining
the right to discovery and aboriginal title in the context of a property dispute)); cf. Worces-
ter v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding the federal government had plenary
power when dealing with Native Americans but Georgia had no jurisdiction over tribal
lands); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (explaining that an Indian
tribe is not a foreign state as discussed in the Constitution).
o ' FELIX S. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (1982).
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dians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."1102
Some commentators believe that such a strong fiduciary obligation
attaches to this federal trust that the original language in
ANILCA defining subsistence users as Native Americans would
pass the strictest standard of review.'
0 3
Congressional support reflecting this trust relationship is
demonstrated by the exemptions particular to the Alaska Natives
in the Marine Mammal Protection Act10 4 (MMPA), the Migra-
tory Bird Treaties with Great Britain, Mexico and Japan,'0 5 and
the Endangered Species Act' 0 (ESA). The courts have followed
suit. The Ninth Circuit recognized the uniqueness of the Alaska
Native subsistence rights in U.S. v. Nuesca.10' In Nuesca, two
Hawaiian Natives were convicted for violations of the ESA after
catching two green sea turtles and a monk seal. Defendants ar-
gued that their equal protection rights were violated because the
Alaska Native, who was similarly situated as an aboriginal people,
could hunt endangered species without penalty while Hawaiian
Natives were prosecuted. The court stated that "Congress had
ample reasons to create exceptions to certain laws for the benefit
of native Alaskans, and to refrain from creating exceptions for
other groups."'108 The convictions were affirmed. The "ample rea-
sons" were not elaborated but would include the lack of alterna-
tive food sources, the isolation of the rural communities, the vast
distances and topographical barriers that separate villages, and
the severity of the climate.
Besides congressional and judicial recognition of the special
subsistence needs of the Alaska Native, the International Whaling
Commission also acknowledged the Native's reliance on wildlife.
102 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
100 See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 5.
'o 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1985). "[T]he provisions of this chapter shall not apply with
respect to the taking of any marine mammal by any Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who resides
in Alaska and who dwells on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean if
such taking is for subsistence purposes." Id.
"0 See CASE. supra note 6, at 280.
10' 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1) (1993). "ITIhe provisions of this chapter shall not apply
with respect to the taking of any endangered species or threatened species, or the importa-
tion of any such species taken pursuant to this section, by (A) any Indian, Aleut, or Es-
kimo who is an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska; or (B) any non-native permanent
resident of an Alaskan native village; if such taking is primarily for subsistence purposes."
I d.
d*1 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991).
10 Id. at 257.
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The Commission relaxed an absolute ban on the hunting and kill-
ing of bowhead whales for the Inupiat villagers of northern
Alaska. The hunting of whales was a community endeavor that
provided a social and cultural exchange as well as food. The ban
had seriously interfered with their "collective and cooperative eco-
nomic and social relationships."' 0 9 The villages are now allotted a
yearly quota of whales based on an annual accounting of the
whale population.
The ANILCA rural classification is not a direct burden on
the right to travel interstate or intrastate. It has, at most, a negli-
gible or minimal impact on the exercise of this right. The non-
rural resident is not denied basic necessities as there are other
food sources readily available in an urban area. In contrast, there
may be no other food sources available to the rural resident. If all
residents were to enjoy the subsistence preference, fewer resources
would be available to both rural and non-rural residents with a
corresponding restriction based on need." 0 For those urban dwell-
ers who have moved from a rural area, the right is easily rein-
stated. The loss of the subsistence preference is not permanent.
Both conservation and subsistence rights are important gov-
ernmental interests. The rural residency language of ANILCA at-
tempts to balance these two competing interests in the least re-
strictive manner possible while still meeting the goals of each. The
individual urbanite is not deprived of basic needs, and his or her
interest in this matter is not of a high order. In light of the federal
trust doctrine that imposes a heavy duty of responsibility towards
Native Americans as well as a strong national interest in conser-
vation, ANILCA would survive an intermediate scrutiny. In order
to ensure an adequate supply of fish and game for everyone, it is
essential to control the number of people to whom subsistence
rights apply. If an anti-cruising ordinance can pass an intermedi-
"I David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska Natives Have a
More "Effective Voice"?, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 1009, 1027 (1989).
11 Whenever it is necessary to restrict the taking of populations of fish and
wildlife on such lands for subsistence uses in order to protect the continued
viability of such populations, or to continue such uses, such priority shall be
implemented through appropriate limitations based on the application of the
following criteria: (I)customary and direct dependence upon the populations
as the mainstay of livelihood; (2)Iocal residency; and (3)the availability of
alternative resources.
16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1980).
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ate scrutiny, the protection of a people's livelihood can also pass
an intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will recognize a new
fundamental right that has no expressly identifiable source, such
as the right to intrastate travel. The Court has made it clear in
Bowers v. Hardwick"' that it will not embark on such determina-
tions: "Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution."' 12 Should the Court adopt such a right, it
would be unlikely to adopt the expanded definition of travel. The
Supreme Court applied the Cole language to the most recent prior
residency requirement violation in Soto-Lopez, describing travel
as the right to migrate. In discussing the source of the right to
travel, the Soto-Lopez decision further clarifies the definition of
travel: "The textual source of the constitutional right to travel, or,
more precisely, the right of free interstate migration, though, has
proved elusive."1 3
In another recent case addressing a possible violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3),"' 4 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic," '5 Justice Scalia does not find a violation of the right to
travel. In this case brought against anti-abortionists obstructing
women's access to abortion clinics, the Court stated
actual barriers to movement' that would have resulted from Pe-
titioners' proposed demonstrations would have been in the imme-
diate vicinity of the abortion clinics, restricting movement from
one portion of the Commonwealth of Virginia to another . . .
Such a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right
of interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally against
"- 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(holding a Georgia statute banning sodomy was lawful as
there is no constitutional right to practice sodomy).
112 Id. at 194.
11 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986)(plurality)(emphasis added).
-' 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
", 113 S.Ct. 753, 763 (1993).
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travelers from other States, unless it is applied discriminatorily
against them." 6
There is no discrimination against non-rural residents of Alaska.
The McDowell plaintiffs do not fall into a "suspect group" that
would trigger strict scrutiny under Equal Protection; they are not
"a discrete and insular minority that is unable to shake or rise
above the bonds and stigma of its minority status: [c]ourts have
been unwilling to extend suspect class status to any classification
other than race, alienage, and national origin." '117
On a larger scale, this is a classic case of environment versus
development. Before 1958, less than one percent of Alaska was in
private hands. The Statehood Act plus ANCSA and ANILCA
withdrew more than two hundred and fifty million acres for the
State, for claims by the Natives, and for conservation by the fed-
eral government." 8 Since then, urban population has increased at
a greater rate than the rural population, the tourist trade has
boomed, more and more sport hunters and fishers want to experi-
ence and take advantage of the "last great frontier," new roads
making more land accessible are being planned, and greater devel-
opment of the mineral industry has been proposed. Subsistence
rights stand in the way of some of these growth spurts so that
while the right to travel may not further limit the Native Ameri-
can way of life, future attacks on ANILCA are sure to come.
Governor Hickel, expounding on one of his four lawsuits against
the United States" 9 challenging federal control in Alaska, claims
the statehood act "guarantee[d] that we would use the land to
create an economy,"'120 and he intends to hold the government to
its promise.
116 Id. at 795.
Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 752 (W.D. Va. 1986).
See, COHEN. supra note 101, at 758-59.
119 See Brian S. Akre, Hickel Readies Fed Suit, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER,
July 23, 1993, at 1. "Congress 'induced' Alaskans to ratify the Statehood Act in 1958 by
promising the state broad opportunities to develop federal lands." Id. (filing suit seeking to
recover $29 billion that the State has lost by ANILCA's withdrawal of land from develop-
ment. The other three suits address the State's claim to navigable waters, the State's right
to manage fish and game on federal lands, and the federal ban on foreign export of North
Slope oil.).
120 Glenn Boledovich, State to Sue Feds-Hickel, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER,
June 18, 1993, at Al.
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